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COMMENT
AFDC ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS UNRELATED
TO NEED: THE IMPACT OF KING v. SMITH *
This Comment explores a vital aspect of the federal-state relation-
ship in the administration of the Aid to Families With Dependent Chil-
dren (AFDC) 1 program: whether a state may impose eligibility re-
quirements other than those specifically authorized or required by the
Social Security Act. A review of the genesis of the AFDC provisions
and of the history of state-imposed eligibility requirements under these
provisions provides the necessary background for examination of the
Supreme Court's decision in King v. Smith,' which significantly
changed what was thought to be the law in this field. Finally, areas
of the law made doubtful by King are discussed. Attention is directed
throughout toward interpreting the AFDC provisions of the Social
Security Act; ' constitutional questions are beyond the scope of this
Comment.
* Professor Edward V. Sparer of the University of Pennsylvania Law School
suggested the topic for this Comment. His guidance has proven immeasurably helpful;
of course, he bears no responsibility for errors of any nature.
142 U.S.C. §§ 601-10 (1964), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1969). One of the several
major categories of public assistance programs established by the Social Security Act
of 1935, Act of Aug. 14, 1935, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620-48, as amended 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-
1394 (1964), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1969), AFDC is part of a system of "cooperative
federalism," King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 316 (1968), in which the federal govern-
ment provides funds in part according to the amount of each state's contribution to
the program. To participate, a state must devise a plan for administering aid which
meets requirements specified in the Act; but states have been permitted a great deal
of flexibility in the development of their programs.
The wide variety which appears from one State plan to another under the same
title [of the Act] is further evidence that the States control the shape of
their assistance programs.
F. White, Equitable Treatment Under the Public Assistance Titles, Nov. 5, 1963, at 2
[hereinafter cited as White]. The White paper was prepared by a research assistant
for the Department of Health, Education, & Welfare (HEW) and does not represent
official HEW policy. Comment, Welfare's "Condition X," 76 YALE L.J. 1222, 1222
n.5 (1967).
Until 1962, the program was called "Aid to Dependent Children" (ADC). To
avoid confusion, the term "AFDC" is used throughout this Comment, even where
"ADC" would be historically proper.
Amendments to the Social Security Act frequently renumbered subsections of the
Act, particularly within § 402. For example, § 402(a) (10), 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (10)
(Supp. IV, 1969) was formerly § 402(a) (9), 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (9) (1964). All
citations in this Comment are to the current code provisions.
2392 U.S. 309 (1968), noted in 47 N.C.L. Rxv. 228 (1968); 47 TEXAs L. Rv.
349 (1969); 22 VAl't. L. REv. 219 (1968). King is also discussed in Comment,
Non-Need Related Provisions for the Receipt of AFDC, 9 J. FAS. L. 101 (1969) ;
Note, Social Welfare-An Emerging Doctrine of Statutory Entitlement, 44 NoTRE
DAmE LAw. 603 (1969).
3 While much of the analysis presented herein may be applicable to other titles of
the Social Security Act, only title IV (the AFDC provisions) is explicitly discussed
in this Comment.
(1219)
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I. BEFORE King v. Smith
A. The Background and Original Interpretation of the
Social Security Act
Moral considerations have long pervaded American social welfare
programs.4 True to their Elizabethan poor law origins, welfare pro-
grams well into this century ignored the crushing poverty of the
multitude of "unworthy poor": 5 only "gilt-edged widows" ' whose
exceptional moral standards "not only differentiated them from the
mass of paupers but set them apart from the totality of mothers" 7 were
thought worthy of aid. With the Depression came a closer view of
poverty-for many, a first hand view." The "worthy-unworthy" poor
distinction faltered: ' the Social Security Act of 1935 in some ways
broke significantly with the poor law tradition." But although the
Act did not itself dictate a test of moral character, it was interpreted
by the committee reports of both houses of Congress as permitting a
state to "impose such other eligibility requirements-as to means,
moral character, etc.-as it sees fit.""
The states did not hesitate to exercise this option, and so-called
"suitable home" policies shortly became the most common of the state-
imposed eligibility requirements. Accepted social work opinion in
1935 recommended that assistance under the Act be given only to those
children who were "living in a suitable family home meeting the
standards of care and health, fixed by the laws of [the] state." 2 The
suitable home provisions were viewed as necessary to "raise the
standards of home care" in AFDC households. 3 Policies similar to
suitable home provisions had for years regulated the lifestyle of re-
cipients in earlier welfare programs,'4 and AFDC suitable home
4 See W. BELL, AID TO DEPENDENT CHILDREN pas$rim (1965) [hereinafter cited as
BELL].
6 See id. 3-19.
Id. 9. "In 1931, across the nation, the mothers in the caseload were widows in
82 percent of the families whose marital status was known." Id. (footnote omitted).
7 Id. 13.
8 See id. 20, 25 (reference to the "democratizing effect" of the Depression).
9Cf. id. 19-20.
1o See id. 224 n.5. For example, it provided for cash payments for use as re-
cipients desired. Act of Aug. 14, 1935, ch. 531, §406(b), 49 Stat. 629, as amended
42 U.S.C. § 606(b) (Supp. IV, 1969) ; see H.R. REP. No. 615, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.
24 (1935); S. REP. No. 628, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1935).
1 H.R. REP. No. 615, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1935); S. REP. No. 628, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1935). See also 79 CONG. REc. 5679 (1935) (remarks of
Representative Jenkins).
1 2 BELL 29 (quoting AMERICAN PUBLIC WELFARE Ass'N, SUGGESTED STATE LEGIS-
LATION FOR SOCAm SECURITY 26 (1935)) ; cf. BELL 7.
1 3 BELL 30 (quoting AMERICAN PUBLIC WELFARE Ass'N, SUGGESTED STATE LEGIs-
LATION FOR SOCIAL SECURITY (1935)).
14 See BELL 12-13, 177.
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provisions were administered with similar disregard for recipient
autonomy. The suitable home doctrine was at times invoked to require
religious training for children,'" but most frequently to discourage im-
morality and illegitimacy."8 But the doctrine provided a vehicle for
less benign motives as well. Public apathy or even hostility towards
the AFDC program, combined with the almost limitless discretion
afforded caseworkers by the suitable home policies, 17 permitted a lower-
ing of welfare costs by cutting illegitimate and black children from the
rolls: 18 blacks had a relatively high rate of illegitimacy, 9 and also the
least "suitable" homes simply because they were among the poorest
applicants."0 Opposition to such discriminatory actions from the fed-
eral agency then administering AFDC took form with the development
of "Condition X."
B. Condition X (The Equitable Treatment Doctrine)
The committee reports suggesting that a state might "impose such
other eligibility requirements . . . as it sees fit" 21 were never inter-
preted literally by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
(HEW) or its predecessor agencies. At least in intra-agency
discussions, it was continuously insisted that certain eligibility require-
ments could not be imposed by the states.' Yet the rationale behind
this federal policy-variously known as Condition X 23 (or more pre-
cisely, Condition 2(a) (x) ),24 the Equitable Treatment Doctrine,2 or
15 Id. 30.
16 See id. passim.
17 See, e.g., id. 181.
18 See id. passim. "The desire of states to restrict their programs selectively is
also shown by the appearance of a series of closely related eligibility conditions which
primarily affected nonwhite and illegitimate children." Id. 175.
-1 Id. 181-82.
2 0 See id. 42-43, 182. But cf. id. 182, where Bell notes: "A few reports suggest
that neglect is more common among white families."
2 1 Note 11 supra & accompanying text.
22 White 1.
23 Welfare's "Condition X," mspra note 1, passim.
24 Each title of the Social Security Act sets forth a list of requirements which
state plans must satisfy in order to qualify for federal funding. These are set out in
a parallel manner in §§2(a), 402(a), 1002(a), and 1402(a) of the Act. In addition
to the statutory requirements of subsections (a) (1), (a) (2), (a) (3), etc., found in
each title, the agency thought it was imposing an additional condition-namely, condi-
tion (a) (x). Hence the policy was dubbed "condition 2(a) (x)." White 8 n.9.
Throughout this Comment, the term "Condition X" will be used to denote the
federal agency's policy although the exact nature of the policy varied over the years.
It should be noted that Condition X was thought to apply to all titles of the Act,
not only to the AFDC provisions. In fact Congress explicitly enacted what are in
substance the provisions of Condition X in three other titles of the Social Security
Act. §§2(a)(10)(B) & (11)(D), 1602(a)(13), 1902(a) (17) (A), 42 U.S.C. §§302
(a) (10) (B) & (11) (D), 1382(a) (13), 1396a(a)(17) (1964), as amended, (Supp.
IV, 1969).
2 White 1 (title).
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the Principle of Equity and Uniformity 2 -was never clearly defined."
One early formulation of Condition X required that the states
keep within basic legal principles of classification . . . .They
must not classify . . . upon any basis of grouping that is
not germane in some degree to the problem at hand. We
must insist on good authority that they shall not exclude
people because of the color of their skin or the contingency of
their racial antecedents and, as we have diligently argued,
their religious predilections.
28
As this statement suggests, Condition X was originally conceived of in
terms of general equal protection principles,2 9 and this conception was
relied upon as partial justification for the application of Condition X
through the 1950's.30 Thereafter statutory considerations were relied
upon as a justification." The doctrine itself remained analogous to
equal protection concepts: HEW would approve a state plan containing
an eligibility requirement not expressly authorized by the Social
Security Act "only if the classification affecting such [additional]
limitation is a rational one in the light of the purposes of public assist-
ance programs." 32
Despite this policy, the federal agency seldom disapproved state
plans even though many states continued to use eligibility requirements
conflicting with any formulation of Condition X.33 Public antagonism
toward AFDC and, perhaps, fear of congressional disapproval of
aggressive federal leadership were among the deterrents to active en-
forcement.8 4 Also important was the drastic nature of the sole
remedy-termination of funds for the state's entire AFDC pro-
2 6 Id. 1, 8.
2
7Id. 1.
2S Id. 4 (quoting A. D. Smith, Memorandum to Geoffrey May, Dec. 20, 1939, at 4).
29 See White 6-7.
." Id. 13.
31 Id. 15. See generally id. 12-16.
32 Welfare's "Condition X," supra note 1, at 1222 (quoting A. Willcox, Memoran-
dum Concerning Authority of the Secretary, Under Title IV of the Social Security
Act, to Disapprove Michigan House Bill 145 on the Ground of its Limitations on
Eligibility, Mar. 25, 1963, at 1).
83 For if anything at all is completely clear in this area of the law it is
that the failure of HEW to cut off funds from a state program has no meaning
at all.
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 516 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ; see id. at 507
(Douglas, J., dissenting) ; Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum, app. A, at 2 n.1, Digesualdo
v. Shea, Civil No. C-1827 (D. Colo., filed 1970) (companion case to Barksdale v.
Shea, Civil No. C-1967 (D. Colo., filed 1970)) : "One year after Shapiro v. Thompson,
eight states still retain durational residency requirements under AFDC. HEW has
only recently indicated that it might move to correct this?'
Bell implies that such inaction was an abrogation of the federal agency's respon-
sibility. BELL 189.
34 BELL 38, 175; cf. id. 188.
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gram 3 5-- available to the federal agency when a state persisted in its
course of action despite federal protest." Enforcement of this sanction
would imperil all the needy children in a state, and could conceivably
provoke a state to withdraw entirely from the AFDC program.37
Finally, national political considerations may help explain the pattern
of enforcement of Condition X.3s
The doctrine was invoked in several important instances, however,
and received legislative and some judicial countenance in the process.
During the 1930's, the federal administrative agency refused to approve
Georgia's plans to establish a racial quota in its welfare program, 39 as
well as Arizona's attempted exclusion of Indians living on reserva-
tions.4" The congressional response to this latter agency action was
such that "[i] t would be difficult to find a clearer case of Congressional
acquiescence in an administrative interpretation." "' In the 1950's, the
federal administrative agency announced that state AFDC plans deny-
35 Act of Aug. 14, 1935, ch. 531, § 404, 49 Stat. 628. In 1968, the Act was amended
to permit the federal agency to terminate funds for only part of the state plan, at the
agency's discretion. § 404(a), 42 U.S.C. § 604(a) (Supp. IV, 1969). The considera-
tions discussed in the text continue to be important. If the federal agency withholds
funds from too small a segment of the state program, the state might simply forego
that portion of its plan.
Negotiations with state agencies are common during the periodic federal review of
state plans. While these negotiations have resulted in many improvements in state
plans, they are normally classified as "bureaucratic secrets" between the federal agency
and the state being reviewed, and therefore "much of their potential for moral and
legal suasion is dissipated." BELL 190-91.
3 6 See Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 426 (1970) (Douglas, J., concurring);
id. at 430 (quoting letter from HEW's General Counsel) ; BELL 189.
37 No state has ever withdrawn from the program, however, and it may be po-
litically unfeasible for any state ever to do so.
38 G. STEINER, SOCIAL INsEcURiTY: TiE POLITICS OF WELFARE 101-07 (1966)
(discussing the reasons underlying HEW's disapproval in 1963 of Michigan's AFDC-
UP plan); cf. BELL 147, 235 n.25 (noting that the Flemming Ruling-text accom-
panying notes 45-46 infra-was promulgated a few days before the change from a
Republican to Democratic national administration).
39 BELL 35 (benefits were granted according to a fixed ratio of black and white
recipients).
4 0 See Petition of the State of Ga. for Reconsideration of Its Proposed Implemen-
tation of Section 208(b) of Pub. L. 90-248, at 5 (HEW, Apr. 2, 1968) (M. Switzer,
Administrator, Social & Rehabilitation Service) [hereinafter cited as 1968 Ga. Con-
formity Hearing], in 1 E. Sparer, Materials on Public Assistance Law, ch. 3, at 66,
70 (Summer 1969) (unpublished materials for use at the University of Pennsylvania
Law School); White 8.
41 White 11. In 1939, the President transmitted to Congress a report of the Social
Security Board specifically mentioning the Indian question. Witnesses before the
appropriate committee of each house suggested that the federal government assume the
entire cost of supporting Indians, and the witness before the Senate committee stated
that the Social Security Act had "been construed to mean that Indians are entitled to
the same benefits as any other individual.' Nevertheless, both committees recom-
mended that Congress enact the 1939 Social Security amendments without any change
in the treatment of Indians. A floor amendment prohibiting the federal agency from
disapproving any state plan "because such plan does not apply to or include Indians"
passed the Senate, but was deleted by the conference committee. Thus no change in
the status of Indians was made by the 1939 amendments. In 1950, Congress enacted
legislation making available for two specific Indian tribes additional grants to the
states proportionate to the states' Social Security Act contributions. But faced again
with the question, Congress did not otherwise disturb the administrative interpretation.
Id. 8-11; see 1968 Ga. Conformity Hearing 5.
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ing aid to illegitimate children would be disapproved.' The agency
also refused to approve another attempt by Arizona to exclude Indians
from one of the public assistance titles, 43 and received limited judicial
sanction for Condition X in the ensuing litigation.44
Condition X reached a high water mark in 1961 when Secretary
of HEW Arthur Flemming responded to a particularly dramatic
situation in Louisiana 5 with the far-reaching and controversial pro-
hibition of suitable home provisions:
Effective July 1, 1961, a state plan . . . may not impose
an eligibility condition that would deny assistance with re-
spect to a needy child on the basis that the home conditions
in which the child lives are unsuitable, while the child con-
tinues to reside in the home. Assistance will therefore be
continued during the time efforts are being made either to
improve the home conditions or to make arrangements for
the child elsewhere.46
To afford state legislatures an opportunity to change their state pro-
visions,4 7 and to provide time to examine the advisability of new legis-
lation,48 Congress extended the effective date of the Flemming Ruling
for one year.49 Congress simultaneously enacted temporary legislation
to permit AFDC assistance to children placed in foster homes "as a
result of a judicial determination" that continued residency in their
present homes would be "contrary to the welfare of such child [ren]." r0
This provision was made permanent in 1962, and was extended to
include children placed in child-care institutions."' The 1962 AFDC
42 1968 Ga. Conformity Hearing 6; BELL 67-75.
43 1968 Ga. Conformity Hearing 5; White 12-13.
44 The District Court for the District of Columbia supported the federal action in
an unreported decision, but in Arizona v. Hobby, 221 F.2d 498 (D.C. Cir. 1954), the
court of appeals dismissed for lack of jurisdiction without reaching the merits. This
instance of enforcement of Condition X was based, however, entirely on fourteenth
amendment equal protection considerations. Further discussion of the case can be
found in 1968 Ga. Conformity Hearing 5-6; White 12-13; Welfare's "Condition X,"
supra note 1, at 1227-28.
45 See generally BEL= 137-47 (Louisiana reduced the size of its AFDC program
from 102,962 recipients in June 1960, to 72,250 in August. Press coverage was such
that "housewives in England, school children in the Far West" sent money and
clothing).
46 State Letter No. 452, Bureau of Public Assistance, Social Security Administra-
tion, HEW (1961).
47 See S. REP. No. 165, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961), in 1961 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 1716, 1721.
48See CONF. REP. No. 307, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961), in 1961 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 1723, 1725.
49 Act of May 8, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-31, §4(b), 75 Stat. 77, as amended 42
U.S.C. § 604(b) (Supp. IV, 1969).
51o Act of May 8, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-31, § 2, 75 Stat. 76, as amended 42 U.S.C.
§608 (1964), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1969). This Act was primarily an accommoda-
tion for Michigan's policies. See BELL 150, 235-36 n.28.
31 Act of July 25, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-543, §§ 101 (b) (2) (D), 104 (a) (3) (F),
(G), 131(b), 135(a)-(e), 155(a), 76 Stat. 180, 185, 193, 196, 197, 207, as antended
42 U.S.C. § 608 (1964), as amtended, (Supp. IV, 1969).
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amendments also modified the Flemming Ruling by permitting states
to disqualify from AFDC children living in unsuitable homes if they
are otherwise given "adequate care and assistance." 52 As applied to
children without other means of support, however, Congress left the
Flemming Ruling unchanged.
Condition X was used twice more before the Supreme Court's
decision in King. In 1963, HEW refused to approve Michigan's
AFDC-UP plan 5 3 because it denied aid to children of unemployed
parents not covered by the state's unemployment compensation stat-
ute-which only applied to employers of four or more employees .
4
And in 1968, several weeks before the oral argument in King, HEW
refused to approve Georgia's attempt to institute a waiting list for
AFDC." HEW rested its decision on Condition X and on the statu-
tory requirement that aid be given "with reasonable promptness to all
eligible individuals." -"
II. King v. Smith
In light of the previous restraint typifying the use of Condition X,
the Supreme Court's decision in King was surprising. Despite HEW's
difficulty over the years in settling upon a rationale for the legality of
the doctrine,57 and despite the appellees' arguments in favor of a Con-
dition X approach,"8 the Court based its decision on a rationale impos-
ing even greater restrictions on a state's ability to deny aid to dependent
children.
At issue was Alabama's "substitute father" regulation denying
AFDC benefits to a family whenever the mother "cohabited" in her
home or elsewhere with any single or married male.5" "Cohabitation"
was a euphemism for "'frequent' or 'continuing' sexual relations." 60
Aid was terminated regardless of whether the "substitute father" was
52 Act of July 25, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-543, § 107(b), 76 Stat. 189, as amended
42 U.S.C. § 604(b) (Supp. IV, 1969).
63 § 407, 42 U.S.C. § 607 (1964). This is the "unemployed parent" provision of
title IV. Children with two parents, one of whom is unemployed, can receive AFDC
benefits if the state at its option decides to participate in this part of the program.
5
4G. SnER, supra note 38, at 101-07; see 1968 Ga. Conformity Hearing 7-8;
White, sispra note 1, at 26-28.
6 1968 Ga. Conformity Hearing.
560 § 402(a) (10), 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (10) (Supp. IV, 1969). For a discussion of
this section, see text accompanying notes 83-86 & 124-29 infra.
57 See White, mpra note 1, at 4-28, 42; Welfare's "Condition X," stpra note 1, at
1222-28; text accompanying notes 22-32 supra.
58 Brief for Appellee at 20-21, King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968) ; Brief for
NAACP Legal Defense & Education Fund, Inc., Nat'l Office for the Rights of the
Indigent, & the Center on Social Welfare Policy & Law as Amicus Curiae at 14-15,
King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
50 392 U.S. at 314.
6 0 Id.
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the father of any of the AFDC mother's children, was under any legal
duty to support them, or was actually donating money for their sup-
port."' Declining to decide whether Alabama had denied Mrs. Smith's
children equal protection of the law by discriminating against them on
the basis of their mother's "immorality," the Court found Alabama's
regulation invalid as inconsistent with the Social Security Act. 2
Alabama asserted two state interests in justification for its refusal
to allot AFDC assistance to households with substitute fathers, even
though the children were needy:
[F] irst, it discourages illicit sexual relationships and illegiti-
mate births; second, it puts families in which there is an
informal "marital" relationship on a par with those in which
there is an ordinary marital relationship, because families of
the latter sort are not eligible for AFDC assistance.
3
The Court disposed of these two arguments with what were in effect
separate lines of reasoning.
A. Discouraging Illegitimacy and Immorality
Notwithstanding Alabama's legitimate interest in discouraging
illegitimacy and immorality, the Court found that the chosen means of
deterrence were precluded by the congressional approval given the
Flemming Ruling. 4 The Court bolstered its conclusion by pointing to
sections 402(a) (14), (15), and (17),' enacted in 1968, which require
states to deal with the problems of illegitimacy and unsuitability of
home conditions by instituting rehabilitative services,66 voluntary family
planning programs, 7 and programs to establish the paternity of and
secure support for illegitimate children.6 This pattern of legislation,
the Court held, demonstrated that
Congress has determined that immorality and illegitimacy
should be dealt with through rehabilitative measures rather
61 Id.
6 2 Justice Douglas, concurring, reached the same result as the majority, but relied
on the fourteenth amendment's guarantee of equal protection of the law. He felt it
necessary to reach the constitutional question primarily because, in his opinion, there
was "a long-standing administrative construction that approves state AFDC plans
containing a man-in-the-house provision," and also because of the possibility that
Alabama would withdraw from the AFDC program yet retain its objectionable pro-
vision. Id. at 334-38. See also note 72 infra.
63 392 U.S. at 318.
64Notes 49-52 supra & accompanying text.
65 42 U.S.C. §§ 602(a) (14), (15), (17) (Supp. IV, 1969).
6 6Id. § 602(a) (14).
,6ld. §602(a) (15).
68 d. §602(a) (17).
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than measures that punish dependent children, and that pro-
tection of such children is the paramount goal of AFDC. 9
The Court may have exaggerated in suggesting that the con-
gressional response to the Flemming Ruling was "statutory ap-
proval," 7' and might also have more clearly noted that the Flemming
Ruling by its terms explicitly prohibits only eligibility requirements
based on the suitability of a child's home. The Ruling should never-
theless be interpreted as prohibiting suitable home provisions as they
were historically administered: primarily to deter illegitimacy and im-
morality.71 Thus, although Alabama's substitute father regulation
ostensibly was not a suitable home provision, it was actually just one
variation thereof, and was prohibited by the Flemming Ruling.
7
The Court's holding on this issue, then, directly prohibits only
state eligibility requirements instituted to deter immorality and il-
legitimacy on the part of adults in the household of the dependent child.
Eligibility requirements of this type are numerous; 73 had the Court
gone no further, the permissible range of state-imposed eligibility re-
quirements would have been severely circumscribed. But the Court's
holding was even more restrictive.
B. Equating Marital and Informal Relationships
Alabama also argued that because children of formal marital
unions were denied AFDC benefits because they had fathers, Alabama's
regulation was a valid method of eliminating inequity by putting chil-
dren of informal "marital" unions (actually, informal sexual liaisons)
609 392 U.S. at 325. In instituting the Work Incentive Program (WIN) amend-
ments, § 402(a) (19), 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (19) (Supp. IV, 1969), Congress faced a
similar problem with respect to parents who refused to work without "good cause."
See S. REP. No. 744, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), in 1967 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 2834, 2860:
Protective and vendor payments would be provided [by the Senate bill] to
protect dependent children from the faults of others. Under the House bill,
such payments would be optional with the States, but under the [Senate]
committee proposal the children must be given this protection.
The conference committee accepted the Senate version, thus providing mandatory pro-
tection for children of parents who refuse to work. See § 402(a) (19) (F) (i), 42
U.S.C. § 602(a) (19) (F) (i) (Supp. IV, 1969).
70 392 U.S. at 324.
71 Text accompanying note 16 supra.
72 "[Substitute parent] policies tended to precede and outlive the ahnost indistin-
guis hable 'suitable home' policies." BELL, supra note 4, at 76 (emphasis added).
Whatever the logical implications of the Flemming Ruling per se, it must be
remembered that HEW did not disapprove all state plans containing substitute father
regulations. See King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 335, 337-38 (1968) (Douglas, J.,
concurring). Bell's criticism of HEW is enlightening:
Had the federal agency issued prompt guidelines establishing limits to state
discretion in defining "substitute parents" or had guidelines been developed
that would prevent the use of any eligibility condition which fell most heavily
on specific groups of needy children, there would be more reason to be
sanguine about ADC.
BELL, supra note 4, at 190; see id. 150-51.
73 See, e.g., text accompanying notes 195-96, 198-99 infra.
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in the same category.74 More specifically, the state asserted that it had
a right to define the term "parent" in section 406(a) of the Act, and
that its regulation, in effect, defined parent to include a "substitute
father." Section 406(a) states:
The term "dependent child" means a needy child . .
who has been deprived of parental support or care by reason
of the death, continued absence from the home, or physical
or mental incapacity of a parent . . . . 7
But the Court held that Congress intended the term "parent" in section
406(a) "to include only those persons with a legal duty of support." 76
According to the Court, the legislative history of the Social Security
Act evinced a congressional purpose "to provide programs for the
economic security and protection of all children." 77 Children de-
prived of the care of a parent would be covered by AFDC.78 Other
children, it was thought, could be aided indirectly; their plight pre-
sented " 'no other problem than that of providing work for the bread-
winner of the family,' "1 and could be assuaged by "'the work relief
program and . . . the revival of private industry.' "80 The Court
also found support for its construction of "parent" in the use of the
same term in other AFDC provisions to designate one who has a legal
duty to support a child.8 '
Because Alabama imposed no support duty on substitute fathers, 2
Mrs. Smith's paramour was not a "parent" within the meaning of
section 406(a) and her children were thus dependent. The Court
considered that finding sufficient to require Alabama under section
"74 392 U.S. at 327; note 63 supra & accompanying text.
[The Alabama regulation] merely purports to define for the purposes of receipt
of public assistance ways to identify a substitute parent .... In marginal in-
come groups ... there would no doubt be a bitter resistance to the matter of
being ineligible merely because persons in the home were married when other
persons similarly situated would be able to receive public assistance solely
because they were unmarried. Undoubtedly the public senses this inequity also.
Reply Brief for Appellants at 2-3, King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
-7542 U.S.C. § 606(a) (Supp. IV, 1969) (emphasis added). "Dependent child"
and "dependent children" are used throughout this Comment in accordance with the
definition set forth in this section of the Act.
76392 U.S. at 327.
77 Id. at 330 (emphasis in original).
78The 1968 AFDC-UP enactments provide that children who have been deprived
of parental support or care because of their father's unemployment can be given aid if
the state elects to participate in this part of the program. § 407, 42 U.S.C. § 607 (Supp.
IV, 1969).
79 392 U.S. at 328 (quoting S. REP,. No. 628, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1935)).
80 Id.
81See id. at 330-33, in which the Court discusses the use of the term "parent" in
§§402(a) (11), (17), (21), (22), 42 U.S.C. §§602(a)(11), (17) (21), (22) (Supp.
IV, 1969) (note that what is presently § 602(a) (11) was § 602(a) (10) at the time
of the King decision).
82See generally Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552 (1970).
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402 (a) (10) '--directing that aid be furnished to "all eligible indi-
viduals"-to provide AFDC assistance to the family. From the Court's
reading of section 402 (a) (10) derives King's major restriction on the
states. For it appears that the Court's view was that Congress in-
tended all dependent children to be given aid, at least absent some
indication that Congress approved of a particular state eligibility re-
quirement denying aid to some dependent children.
1. Evaluation
The Court in King properly determined the scope of section
406(a)-the definition of dependent child-but it should have more
fully and clearly discussed whether section 402 (a) (10) required that
assistance be given to Mrs. Smith's dependent children. Why could
not Alabama choose to aid only some dependent children even though
federal matching funds were available for all such children? The Court
apparently thought either that section 402 (a) (10) federalized the
AFDC eligibility requirements, or that the requirements had always
been purely federal. 4
In light of the emphasis on Alabama's violation of section
402 (a) (10),'5 the Court appears to interpret the section as federalizing
the AFDC eligibility requirements rather than duplicating an original
requirement that the states aid all dependent children. Both approaches,
however, merit examination. What follows is a consideration of the
proper construction of the Social Security Act absent section
402 (a) (10), and then of the effect of this section. Although the issue
is close, this Comment concludes that a proper reading of King and
the Act requires that aid be given to all needy dependent children unless
Congress has authorized the states to impose a specific eligibility
requirement. This conclusion is contrary to what appears to be
HEW's present view: that the states are free to exclude dependent chil-
dren pursuant to any eligibility condition they choose to impose, subject
only to the express prohibition of the Act and the Condition X
doctrine."6
a. The Statute
Section 402(a)(10) aside, the Social Security Act, both as
originally enacted and as presently amended, is ambiguous as to
whether states can impose additional eligibility requirements. Section
83 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (10) (Supp. IV, 1969).
84 See generally text accompanying notes 124-29 infra.
8-3See, e.g., 392 U.S. at 333:
In denying AFDC assistance to appellees on the basis of this invalid regula-
tion, Alabama has breached its federally imposed obligation to furnish "aid to
families with dependent children ... with reasonable promptness to all eligible
individuals . .. ."
S6 See text accompanying notes 113-23 infra.
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401 states that the purpose of the Act is to encourage "the care of
dependent children." 17 Throughout the statute, reference is made to
"dependent children" who are receiving or claiming aid.'8 Thus a
natural inference is that aid is to be given to dependent children as
defined by the Act itself. Congressional intent to permit states to re-
strict aid at their will might be expected to have been expressly
delineated in the statute.8 9
But the Act nowhere explicitly requires states to give aid to all
dependent children. Moreover, section 401 states that the purpose
of the AFDC provisions is not simply to aid dependent children, but
to do so "by enabling each state to furnish financial assistance and
rehabilitation and other services, as far as practicable under the con-
ditions in such state . . . ." .0 Beyond this, section 401 does not
militate against the King conclusion. States establish benefit levels-
that is, the amount of money given to each family-and thereby fix the
size of their AFDC budgets." A construction of the Social Security
Act requiring states to give aid to a federally defined class of recipients
(the size of which they cannot control) would therefore not require
that assistance be furnished beyond what is "practicable" for a state,
because the state could lower its benefit level to conform to its desired
AFDC budget.
b. Legislative History
The legislative history from which King concluded that Congress
intended "to provide programs for the economic security and protection
of all children" suggests that Congress in 1935 expected AFDC to
protect all dependent children, not just those the states wished to
protect. But committees of both the Senate and the House, reporting
on the original Act, provided compelling contrary evidence in asserting
that a state could "impose such other eligibility requirements-as to
means, moral character, etc.-as it sees fit." " Yet perhaps this lan-
guage is less sweeping than a first reading might suggest. The two
examples, means and moral character, may indicate that the breadth
of the statement should be limited to similar eligibility requirements.
Eligibility requirements based on "means" are explicitly authorized by
the federal statute: the Act requires that children receiving AFDC
benefits be "needy," " and it is unquestioned that states determine who
8742 U.S.C. § 601 (Supp. IV, 1969).
8 8 §§402(a) (8), (13), (19) (F) (ii), 21, 42 U.S.C. §§602(a) (8), (15), (19)(F)
(ii), (21) (Supp. IV, 1969).
89 See text accompanying note 136 infra.
90 42 U.S.C. § 601 (Supp. IV, 1969) (emphasis added).
91 See, e.g., Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 408 (1970) ; King v. Smith, 392
U.S. 309, 318-19, 334 (1968).92 See 392 U.S. at 328-30 & sources cited therein; text accompanying notes 77-80
supra.
93 Note 11 supra & accompanying text.
94 § 406(a), 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (Supp. IV, 1969).
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is needyY The moral character of the parent is no longer a valid
basis for an eligibility requirement because of the Flemming Ruling; "'
but the Ruling aside, Congress in 1935 may well have permitted
eligibility requirements based on moral character, even if all other state
eligibility requirements were prohibited, because historically welfare
programs made extensive use of such requirements.
1
In interpreting the 1935 committee reports, the changed nature
of the AFDC program should also be considered. The original AFDC
statute contained significantly fewer provisions regulating state plans
than presently exist. 8 Thus, while AFDC remains basically a state
program, over the years it has become less state-oriented and more
federalized-a trend reflected by President Nixon's proposed Family
Assistance Plan.9
Some legislative history does indicate that in at least certain areas
Congress specifically intended to permit the states a degree of discretion
in determining eligibility. In setting the age limits on children to
whom the states could offer aid and be federally reimbursed on a
matching basis, Congress made clear that its expanding coverage was
not mandatory on the states, although the scope of the option pro-
vided is unclear." ° In 1939, section 406(a) (2) was amended to
expand the definition of dependent child from children sixteen years old
and under to include sixteen- to eighteen-year-old students regularly
attending school. The committee reports of both houses expressly
indicated that the states were permitted a choice whether or not to aid
these children.' The 1956 amendments struck the school requirement
and simply raised age levels from sixteen to eighteen. The committee
reports, although less explicit than the 1939 reports, stated that a de-
cision by the states to aid children within the expanded age limits would
"permit Federal sharing," 102 the choice of the term "permit" perhaps
95 See note 91 suPra.
06 See text accompanying notes 64-73 supra.
9T See BE.LI, supra note 4, at 177, 186-87; cf. id. 13.
98 Section 402(a) of the original statute contained provisions essentially identical
to the present §§ 402(a) (1)-(3), (6), but with provisions less detailed than the current
§§ 402(a) (4), (5). The present § 402(a) contains 23 subsections, some quite detailed.
Compare Act of Aug. 14, 1935, ch. 531, § 402(a), 49 Stat. 627, with 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)
(Supp. IV, 1969).
o0 I- 16311, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618, 677 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citing "current discussions regarding
the 'federalizing' of ... aspects of welfare relief") ; Bs., sipra note 4, at 151 ("[t]he
solution of federalizing state programs . .. deserves a thoughtful reappraisal").
10 Once states have exercised the option to aid some students, they may have to
"go all the way." For example, they may not be able to deny aid to 18-year-old stu-
dents while aiding 17-year-old students, and may not be able to condition aid on
attendance at a certain type of school. It is also important to distinguish the situation
in which a child under 16 is denied AFDC because of poor school attendance. Such a
requirement has no congressional approval, and is therefore impermissible under the
interpretation of King and the Act urged in this Comment. HEW, it should be noted,
has approved plans which contain the latter as well as the former limitations.
101 H.R. REP. No. 728, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 28-29 (1939) ; S. R P. No. 734, 76th
Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1939).
102 S. REP. No. 2133, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1956) (emphasis added).
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indicating an intent to provide the states with an option. Finally, in
1964 and 1965, when amendments increased the age limits to twenty-
one for children in certain types of schools, the committee reports
stated that these changes "would be optional with the States." 103
Similarly, legislative history makes clear that Congress in 1935
intended that states could exclude children living with certain relatives.
One supporter of the 1935 bill stated:
A State will not have to aid every child which it finds to
be in need. Obviously, for many States, that would be too
large a burden. It may limit aid to children living with their
widowed mother, or it can include children without parents
living with near relatives. The provisions are not for general
relief of poor children but are designed to hold broken families
together.
0 4
Assuming that students under the age of twenty-one and children
living with the relatives specified in the Act are always dependent chil-
dren, clearly all dependent children as defined by Congress need not be
given aid. Congress expanded the definition of dependent child, yet
said that states need not aid all those included within the definition.
The interpretation of King urged herein-that a state must aid a de-
pendent child unless legislative history indicates that the state-imposed
eligibility requirement resulting in the denial of aid was approved by
Congress-is consistent with this history. Although King never stated
that congressionally sanctioned state-imposed eligibility requirements
were valid, had the issue arisen, the Court would certainly have given
controlling weight to congressional intent.
The same result-that all dependent children must be aided unless
Congress gives the states an option to exclude a specific category of
dependent children-may be reached by exanining the statutory
definition of dependent child in section 406(a). The section states in
part that:
The term "dependent child" means a needy child (1)
S. .who is living with his . . . [specified relatives] or
niece . . . and (2) who is (A) under the age of eighteen,
or (B) under the age of twenty-one and . . a student
105
It is conceivable that the use of "or" in the quoted provision in-
dicates that states have some discretion in defining dependent children,
and that states may exclude from the definition students eighteen to
twenty-one and children living with certain relatives. Ambiguity in
103 S. REP. No. 1517, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1964). See also 110 CONG. REc.
23701 (1964) (remarks of Representative Mills).
10479 CONG. REc. 9269 (1935) (remarks of Senator Harrison).
105 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (Supp. IV, 1969) (emphasis added).
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the statute permits recourse to the legislative history: and the legis-
lative history just examined supports the proposition that a state enjoys
some latitude in defining dependent child, although it may not deny aid
to any children falling within its definition.
The two analyses are, then: (1) that Congress defined the class
of dependent children in section 406(a) but permitted states to deny
aid to students above the age of eighteen or to children living with
specified relatives; and (2) that Congress in section 406(a) permitted
the states some discretion in defining dependent children insofar-and
only insofar-as they could use the disjunctive "or" to exclude from
the definition children over eighteen and children living with specified
relatives. Either analysis yields the same result: states may deny aid
to these two classes of children and only to these children. For the
sake of convenience, this Comment hereafter will refer only to the
first analysis.
c. Administrative Interpretation
The construction put on a statute by the relevant administrative
agency is of great weight in construing the statute,' particularly if
the administrative interpretation is of long standing, as was the case
with Condition X. The repeated legislative acquiescence in the agency's
disapproval, pursuant to Condition X, of Arizona's plan to exclude
Indians 107 lends extra stature to the doctrine."" Moreover, Condition
X has, in effect, been incorporated into IEW's recently proposed
rules,' 9 and thus is likely to finally become a formal, publicly promul-
gated regulation.
Condition X presumes that some state-imposed eligibility require-
ments more restrictive than those authorized by the Act itself or by
inference from legislative history are valid so long as they are "rational
• . . in the light of the purposes" of the Act. This presumption poses
difficulties. King was certainly correct in concluding that the "pro-
tection of [dependent] children is the paramount goal of AFDC," I"
but the Act has other purposes as well. For example, Congress desired
that states have wide discretion in the operation of their programs,"'
and also to deter parental desertion." The problem with the Condition
X presumption arises partly because the Social Security Act offers no
discernible criteria to distinguish permissible from prohibited state-
imposed requirements, and partly because examinations of rationality
'OOE.g., Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965).
107 Text accompanying notes 40-43 supra.
iOS This congressional acquiescence in the application of Condition X is as con-
sistent with the interpretation of King suggested in this Comment as it is with
Condition X.
109 Proposed HEW Reg., 35 Fed. Reg. 8786 (1970) (proposed 45 C.F.R. §§ 233.10
(a) (1) (ii), (iv) ).
110 392 U.S. at 325.
III See text accompanying note 91 supra.
12 See note 178 infra & accompanying text.
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"in the light of the purposes" of the Act were not restricted to con-
siderations of state eligibility requirements explicitly sanctioned by
Congress. King indeed circumscribed the states' power more than did
Condition X as loosely applied by the administrative agencies. But to
the extent King indicates that the protection of dependent children is
the statutory goal overshadowing all others, the formulation (if not the
administration) of Condition X is effectively the same as the King
rationale.
Additional administrative interpretation is reflected in the amicus
brief " recently filed by HEW in the pending case of Barksdale v.
Shea." '4 At issue is Colorado's regulation limiting AFDC to a class
of recipients smaller than that for which federal matching funds would
be available.
Plaintiffs argued that the definition of dependent child in the
federal statute prevented Colorado from requiring as a condition for
aid school attendance of children sixteen to eighteen years old. The
amicus brief takes the position that only section 402 contains require-
ments for state plans. Section 406(a), HEW asserts, defines the
class of children for which federal matching funds are available, but
does not require the states to aid all such children." ' The brief re-
affirms Condition X,"' claiming that the doctrine is "based upon a
principle of Constitutional law, the overall purpose and intent of the
public assistance titles, the legislative history of the Act and individual
plan requirements." 7 In support of its interpretation of section
406(a) the brief focused on the legislative history indicating that all
dependent children need not be given aid, and particularly the history
indicating that the states have the option to expand their AFDC pro-
grams to include students.-" Moreover, HEW claimed that it and its
predecessor agencies have
consistently maintained that the purpose of section 406 of
the Social Security Act is to delineate the maximum scope
of Federal financial participation available to State AFDC
programs and generally is not to set requirements with which
those programs must comply."
9
But the amicus brief's discussion of King is not entirely consistent
with this view. HEW is clearly aware of and concerned with King's
"language which appears to suggest a result inconsistent with that
"13 Brief for Robert H. Finch, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, as
Amicus Curiae, Barksdale v. Shea, Civil No. C-1967 (D. Colo., filed 1970) [hereinafter
cited as Brief for Amicus Curiae].
"14 Civil No. C-1967 (D. Colo., filed 1970).
115 Brief for Amicus Curiae 4-5.
"6 Id. 9-11.
"17 Id. 10.
118Id. 11-19; see text accompanying notes 93-104 supra.
"19 Brief for Amicus Curiae 3.
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urged by this brief." '0 Nevertheless, the brief attempts to distinguish
King by interpreting Alabama's bizarre definition of parent as an un-
common instance of a state definition creating an eligibility require-
ment clearly in conflict with the dominant purpose of the Act. HEW
does admit to the possibility of other invalid state requirements, how-
ever, by stating that "most" state refusals to aid federally defined
dependent children will not frustrate congressional intent. 2 '
HEW's amicus brief is entitled to some weight as an adminis-
trative interpretation of the AFDC provisions," = although perhaps not
the same weight as a publicly promulgated regulation or policy of long
standing. But this caveat is partly nullified, since HEW's recently
proposed regulations, although by no means clear on this point, appear
to incorporate the interpretation presented in the amicus brief:
Although the public assistance titles define the coverage in
which the Federal Government will participate financially, a
state may provide coverage on a broader or more limited
basis ....
The following is a summary statement regarding the
groups for whom Federal financial participation is available.
[A paraphrase of section 406(a) follows.] 123
The arguments presented in the amicus brief are unpersuasive,
however, for the reasons presented in this Comment. Moreover, in
one sense the amicus brief and proposed regulations come too late.
HEW's position might best have been presented to the King Court;
to the extent that the administrative interpretation conflicts with King
it is entitled to little weight.
d. Section 402 (a) (10)
Section 402(a) (10) requires that a state plan:
provide . . . that all individuals wishing to make application
for aid to families with dependent children shall have oppor-
tunity to do so, and that aid to families with dependent
children shall be furnished with reasonable promptness to all
eligible individuals .. 1.. 24
If the term "eligible individuals" denotes a federal definition including
essentially all those on whose behalf a state could receive federal AFDC
120 Id. 21.
121 Id. 23.
12 Cf. Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 407 (1970); Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471, 515 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
1=3 Proposed HEW Reg., 35 Fed. Reg. 8786 (1970) (proposed 45 C.F.R. §§ 233.10
(a) (1) (i), (b) (2)).
12442 UJ.S.C. § 602 (a) (10) (Supp. IV, 1969).
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matching funds, then this section would require the state to give aid
to all dependent children as defined in section 406(a). The legislative
history of section 402(a) (10) is sparse, however, and generally not
helpful:
The requirement to furnish assistance "with reasonable
promptness" will still permit the States sufficient time to
make adequate investigations but will not permit them to
establish waiting lists for individuals eligible for assistance.' 25
As the Supreme Court has stated, "[a]n extensive alteration in
the basic underlying structure of an established program is not to be
inferred from ambiguous language which is not clarified by legislative
history." 126 It is not clear, however, that a federal definition of
"eligible," as used in section 402(a)(10), would have effected an
extensive alteration of the AFDC program-particularly since the
status of state-imposed eligibility requirements absent this section is
doubtful.12 7 Because this section was designed to restrict the states'
latitude in administering their programs, to interpret "eligible" as a
term to be given a purely federal definition would not be unreasonable.
HEW's amicus brief argues the contrary. After a discussion of
the legislative history of this section, the amicus brief concludes:
The prior history of Title IV indicates clearly that the
Congress was concerned with persons, determined to be
eligible under standards set by the state, who nonetheless
were not receiving assistance.
28
Moreover, according to the brief, the federal agency "has never viewed
that plan requirement as conferring additional authority to prescribe
eligibility criteria on a Federal basis." 129 While this administrative
interpretation was presented too late to influence the King holding, in
view of the meager legislative history of section 402(a) (10) and the
administrative interpretation of this provision, section 402(a) (10)
probably should not be interpreted as an absolute requirement that aid
be furnished for all dependent children as federally defined in section
406(a). A reasonable interpretation of these provisions in light of
King is that a state is prohibited from withholding funds from de-
pendent children unless explicit legislative history indicates that Con-
gress intended to provide states with an option.
125 CONF. REP. No. 2771, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950), in 1950 U.S. CODE CONG.
SERv. 3482, 3507. See also text accompanying note 134 infra.
126 Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 414 n.17 (1970).
12 7 See text accompanying notes 87-91 mupra.
128 Brief for Amicus Curiae 20 (emphasis in original).
3
29 Id.
1970] ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS UNRELATED TO NEED 1237
2. Summary
Relying either on section 402(a) (10) or on the Act as a whole,
the King Court found that, once a child falls within the federal defini-
tion of dependent child, a state is obliged to give aid to the child-
unless legislative history demonstrates congressional approval of a
state-imposed eligibility requirement denying aid to a category of
dependent children. The qualification is appended because the Court
was not faced with such an eligibility requirement; had it been it would
certainly have deferred to congressional intent. Analysis of the statute,
the legislative history, and the administrative interpretation points out
that the strengths and weaknesses of the Court's position are closely
balanced. 13 The remainder of this Comment will examine King's
impact on state-imposed eligibility requirements.
III. AFTER King v. Smith
A. Subsequent Cases
Language in Dandridge v. Williams,'3 ' recently decided by the
Supreme Court, is relevant to an analysis of the King holding. In
Williams, welfare benefits which reached a maximum per family regard-
less of family size were found to meet the requirements of the Social
Security Act and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. Because all "eligible individuals" were receiving some aid no
matter how large their family, the Court found the state's maximum
grant regulation consistent with section 402(a) (10), although indi-
vidual members in large families received less per capita than those
in smaller families.' The Social Security Act permits states to set
benefit levels, and the Act is not violated, the Court held, so long
as "some aid is provided to all eligible families and all eligible
children .... " 133
Although neither this language nor the Williams result in itself
restricts King in any way, one footnote to the Court's opinion could be
interpreted as inconsistent with King. This ambiguous footnote states:
The State argues that in the total context of the federal
statute, reference to "eligible individuals" means eligible
130 Policy considerations support the Court's position. The Advisory Council ap-
pointed by the Secretary of HEW in 1964, acting under a congressional directive
contained in the 1962 Social Security amendments, recommended legislation in which
"[n]eed would be the sole measure of entitlement." U.S. ADVISORY COUNCIL ON
PUBLIC WELFARE, HAVING THE PowER, WE HAVE THE DUTY xiii (1966). The Ad-
visory Council also recommended that while "planning goes forward to achieve
basic reforms . ..in their state plans for public assistance, states should be required
to include all types of persons eligible under federal law." Id. 113 (capitalization
omitted). Bell's recommendations are substantially the same. See BELL, supra note
4, at 195.
131397 U.S. 471 (1970).
132 Id. at 481.
133 Id.
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applicants for AFDC grants, rather than all the family
members whom the applicants may represent, and that the
statutory provision was designed only to prevent the use of
waiting lists. There is considerable support in the legislative
history for this view. See H.R. Rep. No. 1300, 81st Cong.,
1st Sess., 48, 148 (1949) ; 95 Cong. Rec. 13934 (1949) (re-
marks of Rep. Forand). And it is certainly true that the
statute contemplates that actual payments will be made to
responsible adults. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 605. For the
reasons given above, however, we do not find it necessary to
consider this argument. 4
The Court in this footnote refers to two state arguments: first, that
"eligible individuals" in section 402(a) (10) refers to adult applicants
for AFDC rather than to individual members of families receiving aid;
second, that section 402 (a) (10) prohibits only waiting lists. Whether
the Court thought that there was "considerable support" for both these
propositions, or only for the former, is unclear. But the legislative
history and the statutory provision cited by the Court refer only to
the first state argument, and the Court probably referred approvingly
only to this proposition.
Although the Williams majority neither reaffirmed nor undercut
the interpretation of King discussed in this Comment, the three dis-
senting Justices stated that in their opinion state-imposed eligibility
requirements denying aid to dependent children are prohibited by
the Social Security Act. Justice Douglas thought that:
The history of the Social Security Act thus indicates that
Congress intended the financial benefits, as well as the other
benefits, of the AFDC program to reach each individual re-
cipient eligible under the federal criteria. It was to this
purpose that Congress had reference when it commanded in
§ 402 (a) (10) of the Act that aid to families with dependent
children shall be furnished to "all eligible individuals." "5
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, reasoned as follows:
The phrase "aid to families with dependent children,"
from which the AFDC program derives its name, appears in
§ 402(a) (10) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (10) (1964
ed., Supp. IV), and is defined in 42 U.S.C. § 606(b) (1964
ed., Supp. IV) as, inter alia, "money payments with respect
to . . . dependent children." (Emphasis added.) More-
over, the term "dependent child" is also extensively defined in
the Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1964 ed., Supp. IV).
134 Id. at 481 n.12.
135 Id. at 502 (emphasis added).
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Nowhere in the Act is there any sanction or authority for
the State to alter those definitions-that is, to select arbi-
trarily from among the class of needy dependent children
those whom it will aid. Yet the clear effect of the maximum
grant regulation is to do just that, for the regulation creates
in effect a class of otherwise eligible dependent children with
respect to whom no assistance is granted.
It was to disapprove just such an arbitrary device to
limit AFDC payments that Congress amended § 402(a) (10)
in 1950 to provide that aid "shall be furnished with reason-
able promptness to all eligible individuals." (Emphasis
added.) Surely as my Brother DOUGLAS demonstrates, this
statutory language means at least that the State must take
into account the needs of, and provide aid with respect to,
all needy dependent children. Indeed, that was our assess-
ment of the congressional design embodied in the AFDC pro-
gram in King v. Smith .... ""
Thus Justices Marshall and Brennan thought that the scheme of
the Social Security Act indicated the Act had always prohibited state-
imposed eligibility requirements; section 402 (a) (10), in their view,
was intended to reaffirm this prohibition. Justice Douglas appears to
have reached the same conclusion.
Several lower court cases have clearly indicated that King should
be interpreted as prohibiting state-imposed eligibility requirements.
Evans v. Department of Social Services,117 Cooper v. Laupheimer,38
and Doe v. Shapiro "' are discussed below. 4 Damico v. California'141
involved a California statute and the regulation interpreting it. These
provisions denied AFDC benefits to a family during the first three
months of a parent's absence from the home unless legal action had
been taken to terminate the marriage or the parent had been in-
carcerated or deported. Avoiding the constitutional arguments pressed
upon it, the court held that the statute and regulation in practical
effect established "a rigid three-month waiting period for children
deserted by one parent, unless the remaining parent takes legal action
to terminate the marriage." " Relying on the King conclusion that
136 Id. at 510-11 (emphasis in original).
137- Mich. App. -, 178 N.W2d 173 (1970).
138 Civil No. 69-2421 (E.D. Pa., Apr. 16, 1970).
139302 F. Supp. 761 (D. Conn. 1969), appeal dimnissed for failure to docket
wuithin prescribed time, 396 U.S. 488 (1970) (Black & Douglas, JJ., dissenting).
140 Text accompanying notes 162-68, 187-90 infra.
1412 CCH Pov. L. REP. 10,478, at 11,370 (N.D. Cal., Sept. 12, 1969). A Min-
nesota statute and regulation essentially identical to that in Damico were declared
invalid by a federal district court in Doe v. Hursh, No. 4-69-Civil 403 (D. Minn.,
June 30, 1970). The court, citing King, held that § 402(a) (10), 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)
(10), "together with [§406(a),] 42 U.S.C. § 606(a), details the obligation of the
participating state." Id. at 5.
342 2 CCH Pov. L. REP. at 11,373.
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"protection of [dependent] children is the paramount goal of
AFDC," " the court found the California statute and regulation in-
consistent with the purpose of the federal statute and thus prohibited
under King.
The court refused to accept two asserted state justifications for
the provisions, reasoning that King prohibited placing "administrative
convenience ahead of the welfare of needy children." ' First, the
state's interest in preventing fraud and collusion between parents was
considered a justification similar to that rejected in King.'45 Second,
discouraging parents from separating by requiring a three-month
waiting period for AFDC was viewed as a "legitimate interest . .
clearly promoted by means impermissible under the Federal Act, because
it postulates deprivation of the children as the club to keep the parents
together." " In any event, that this interest was actually furthered
by the California provision was unclear, because available statistics
indicated that the provision encouraged divorce. Thus the California
law conflicted with an expressed purpose of the Social Security Act:
to "help maintain and strengthen family life." '1 The court also
found that there were two crucial inquiries in dealing with such justi-
fications for a state's eligibility requirements: "Are the children eligible
and needy? Is the absence of the parent 'continued' ?" 148
Although much of the Damico opinion was based simply on a
judgment that the California law was inconsistent with the primary
federal purpose,'49 the logical extension of the court's analysis would
be that all dependent children must be given aid. In defining the
"crucial inquiries," the court could not have used the word "eligible"
to mean eligible under the state criteria, because a state's definition of
eligibility is necessarily compatible with its justification therefor.
Rather, the court must have asked: "Are the children eligible under
the federal criteria?"
The recent case of McClellan v. Shapiro ... upheld a Connecticut
statute excluding from Connecticut's AFDC program children above
the age of nineteen who are attending college or vocational school.
Focusing on the legislative history previously discussed,'-" the court
held that Congress left to the states the decision whether to aid chil-
dren because they are students. Thus, in giving effect to the con-
gressional intent evidenced by this legislative history, McClellan is
143 Text accompanying note 69 supra.
144 2 CCII Pov. L. REP. at 11,373.
145 Id.
14
6 Id. at 11,374.
147 § 401, 42 U.S.C. § 601 (Supp. IV, 1969).
1482 CCII Pov. L. REP. at 11,374 (emphasis added).
149 See id. at 11,372 (emphasizing the conflict with "the primary purposes of the
AFDC program.").
150 Civil No. 13,267 (D. Conn., Apr. 29, 1970).
151 Text accompanying note 103 supra.
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consistent with the interpretation of King suggested in this Comment.
Moreover, language in McClellan supports this interpretation. The
court adopted the analysis discussed above-that section 406(a) is
ambiguous and that states have some discretion in defining dependent
child: 152
At issue here is the proper interpretation of [section 406(a),
42 U.S.C.] § 606(a) ....
Obviously, if part (2) (B) of [this] section is not re-
garded as an optional alternative to (2) (A) instead of an
enlargement of it . . . [Connecticut's statute] conflicts with
606(a) ."a
B. Distinguishing Eligibility Requirements Based on Need
Although King forbids all state-imposed eligibility requirements
unrelated to need unless congressional intent indicates otherwise, states
retain the power to establish standards of need and levels of benefits.
Standards of need determine the putative economic requirements of a
family; levels of benefits represent that percentage of each family's need
that the state is willing to provide.
Section 406(a) defines as dependent a needy child meeting the
other specified requirements. 54 Because a state may determine who
is needy, but is prohibited by King from establishing other eligibility
requirements, eligibility requirements based on need must be carefully
distinguished from eligibility requirements based on other considera-
tions. The pertinent inquiry is whether the state regulation is based
on a determination of the amount of money the applicant or recipient
and his family have available and the amount they require to maintain
a certain standard of living.
A state regulation serving generally to terminate aid rather than
to diminish the size of the grant indicates that the regulation may be
nonneed related. A need-related regulation results in termination of
AFDC when an individual is no longer needy. Usually, however,
AFDC recipients become only less needy rather than not needy at all.
Therefore a true need-related regulation normally results only in
diminution of aid.
The line to be drawn between regulations related and unrelated
to need is fine. A regulation forever barring from the AFDC program
a family which has fraudulently obtained aid is clearly an eligibility
requirement unrelated to need: however needy, the family cannot re-
ceive aid. But a regulation diminishing or terminating aid following
an investigation showing that the fraudulently received funds have so
improved the family finances as to make the family presently less
15 2 Text accompanying notes 104-06 supra.
153 Civil No. 13,267, at 8.
35 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (Supp. IV, 1969).
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needy or not needy is clearly need-related and permissible. Yet a pro-
cedure terminating benefits until the amount fraudulently obtained is
recouped is unrelated to need if the family's present financial status is
disregarded. The state has either followed this procedure to deter
fraud or to recoup funds, conclusively presuming that need has
diminished despite the possibility that the family has spent all the
fraudulently obtained funds and is as impoverished as ever. The
scheme may guarantee restitution and perhaps punishment, but if it
disregards the actual needs of the family it is nonneed related and
impermissible.
C. The Range of Issues
At this point a discussion of specific examples would be helpful.
State regulations subject to attack under the King holding are nu-
merous, however, and thus this Comment will attempt a thorough
discussion of only two general categories of state eligibility require-
ments. These categories have been chosen because they represent
common types of state eligibility requirements and because litigation
in these areas has resulted in judicial recognition of the King rationale
presented above.
1. Fraud
The incidence of welfare fraud in various states and localities has
been much debated by politicians; evidence on the extent of the prob-
lem tends to be conflicting and difficult to interpret. 55  Any discussion
of the policy reasons underlying enforcement against fraud must be
grounded in a realization that what is referred to as "welfare fraud"
involves greatly disparate degrees of moral turpitude. Failure to re-
port additional income, such as unemployment compensation, is a
common type of fraud. 5 " A sham transfer of property prior to ap-
plication for assistance is another. 5 7  Until recently,.15 the New York
welfare department's long-standing policy was that welfare recipients
were not permitted to have any savings; recipients who attempted to
save money from their welfare grant were considered to have com-
mitted fraud. 5
15 See BELL, supra note 4, at 61-63 (suggesting that fraud is a relatively small
problem which is magnified by political ambitions). "There are some who contend
that everyone receiving assistance commits fraud to some extent .... Others say the
incidence of fraud is very low." Aikman & Berger, Prosecution of Welfare Fraud in
Cook County: The Anatomy of a Legal System, 45 U. DET. J. URBAN L. 287, 316
(1967) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter cited as Fraud in Cook County].
156 See Fraud in Cook County 299.
1572 Sparer, supra note 40, ch. 7, at 68 (citing Conn. State Welfare Manual
§ 126.1).
158 The policy has been changed. New York City Dep't of Social Services,
Informational No. 68-19 (Mar. 14, 1968), noted in 13 WELFARE L. BuLL., June 1968,
at 13.
159 Cf. Hunt v. Bonilla, (N.Y. County Ct., Apr. 5, 1968), noted in 13 WELFARE L.
BuLL., June 1968, at 12 (benefits reduced by amount of unreported savings).
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Evidence of past fraud is grounds in many states for termination
or reduction of benefits.1"' The circumstances under which such a
policy is unrelated to need-and therefore prohibited by King-have
been discussed.' A state's desire to deter moral turpitude in general,
and welfare fraud in particular, is similar to the interest asserted by
Alabama in King. This was the holding in Evans v. Houston, -2 in
which a Michigan county court, relying partly on King, prohibited the
total denial of AFDC benefits to a family because the mother had been
convicted of fraud.
In Evans v. Department of Social Services,' the Michigan Court
of Appeals affirmed Evans v. Houston in an opinion based on a con-
struction of the Iichigan act implementing AFDC in that state. The
court's construction of the Michigan act followed the construction of
the Federal Act implicit in King. The court interpreted Michigan's
act as authorizing the revocation of assistance "[o]nly where a re-
cipient is no longer 'dependent' within the meaning of [the Michigan
definition of dependent child, which parallels the federal definition] or
is no longer in financial need." 164 Because fraud is relevant to neither
criterion, the state could not cut off funds on that basis. Thus this
decision explicitly supports the view that states may normally not
impose additional non-need-related eligibility requirements.
A three-judge federal court in Cooper v. Laupheimer 5 reached
the same conclusion. Cooper was a class action attacking a Penn-
sylvania regulation requiring that restitution be made for duplicate
assistance payments by reduction in the amount of future welfare
checks, whether procured through fraud or mistake, regardless of the
family's financial status. Relying on King, the court held that the
duty imposed by section 402(a) (10) "is breached if an otherwise
eligible child is deprived of AFDC funds because of parental mis-
conduct." 100 Holding that "Congress established only two prerequi-
sites for eligibility: need and dependency," 117 the court concluded that
states have a duty to provide "current payments for current needs." 168
Under the Evans and Cooper rationale, the state admittedly has
a difficult problem of deterrence. The state can still criminally prose-
cute the offender; but because welfare fraud often carries severe
sentences,6 9 prosecution may be an overly harsh deterrentY.70  Because
160 Cf. 2 Sparer, supra note 40, ch. 7, at 58-60.
161 Text following note 154 supra.
162 2 CCH Pov. L. REP. 1 9615 (Mich. Cir. Ct., Jan. 30, 1969).
163 - Mich. App. -, 178 N.W. 2d 173 (1970).
164 Id. at -, 178 N.W. 2d at 179.
165 Civil No. 69-2421 (E.D. Pa., Apr. 16, 1970).
106 Id. 13.
107 Id. 15.
168 Id. 16.
169 See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 49, § 17(21) (1958) (maximum penalty of $500 fine,
and/or 1 year at hard labor).
170 But cf. Fraud in Cook County 316 ("[M]uch empirical research is needed,
. . . deterrence remains an uncertain rationale.").
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children may suffer if their parent is sent to jail or fined, criminal
prosecution is normally inadvisable,17 ' as is any remedy. But if the
state is insistent, a less harsh remedy would be a requirement of restitu-
tion, or at least an option of restitution or jail. Although this approach
may be as onerous for the AFDC family as outright aid termination,172
it has several advantages. If the offender is given an option to repay
or be imprisoned, at least it is he 173 who is deciding what would be
better for his family. And even if no option is presented, at least the
determination of guilt is made by a court with the protection of a com-
plete adversary procedure, rather than by a state administrator in an
informal proceeding." Also, if benefits could be reduced because of
fraud, it would be possible both to terminate AFDC and to institute
criminal prosecution. Possibly the best solution when a state feels
that some action must be taken would be to institute a civil proceeding. 75
HEW regulations originally did not allow reduction in benefits
because of prior fraud, but rather permitted only a need test to deter-
mine benefit payments:
Assistance payments must be based on need in the light of
currently available income or resources. Current payments
cannot be reduced because of prior overpayment, if the re-
cipient no longer has the income available which occasioned
the overpayment. Examples: Unreported income several
months ago which is no longer available, as well as agency
overpayments.76
1T1 See id. 297-99 (discussion of factors influencing the decision whether to prose-
cute in one jurisdiction).
172 id. 316-18 (emphasizing the stigma and employment handicap accompanying
a criminal record, and suggesting methods for mitigating this aspect of the problem).
173 Actually the parent receiving aid is normally the mother; this Comment uses
the word "he" only for the sake of generality.
'7 4 But cf. Fraud in Cook County 309-11, 313-14 (criticizing the lack of attorneys
in these cases).
175 It may be that for many welfare recipients it is not the threat of criminal
conviction that is effective, but the threat of court action of any kind; courts
mean lost time, maybe lost earnings, and confrontation with a lawyer and
judge. It may be that the threat of any court action, including a civil action,
would be as effective as is the threat of criminal prosecution.
Civil actions are presently used by the Department of Public Aid, but only
when the welfare recipient has an identified and readily available fund, such
as a bank account, or when he owns property which can be attached. It would
seem that the Department of Public Aid could expand its use of the civil
courts to cases 'where immediate recovery is not available by bringing actions
of debt of contract or by obtaining a confession of judgment. The record of
recovery could hardly be less successful that the current record, and the threat
of court action would be retained. Although a larger collection staff might
be required and greater diligence on the part of the staff would certainly be
required, the net gain, measured in both financial and human gain, might more
than justify the change.
Id. 317-18 (footnotes omitted).
176 U.S. Dep't of Health, Education, & Welfare, Handbook of Public Assistance
Administration, pt. IV, § 3120 (Transmittal 120, effective July 1, 1967), in 2 Sparer,
s=pra note 40, ch. 7, at 71.
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Thus the original regulations permitting only a need test were con-
sistent with King, as interpreted by Cooper and Evans. But this
regulation was recently amended to provide that
current payments of assistance will not be reduced because
of prior overpayments unless the recipient has income or
resources currently available in the amount by which the
agency proposes to reduce payment; except that where there
is evidence which clearly establishes that a recipient willfully
withheld information about his income or resources, such
income or resources may be considered in the determination
of need to reduce the amount of the assistance payment in
current or future periods .... .77
The HEW regulation as it now stands, if it results in aid termination,
conflicts with King because it permits a state policy unrelated to need
in the case of a "willful" withholding of information.
2. NOLEO-Related Rules
A 1950 AFDC amendment provided that, beginning in 1952, a
state plan must
provide for prompt notice to appropriate law-enforcement
officials of the furnishing of aid to families with dependent
children in respect of a child who has been deserted or aban-
doned by a parent ... . '
This amendment, commonly known as Notice to Law Enforcement
Officials, or NOLEO, was enacted at a time when the AFDC program
was under attack on many fronts.' 9 NOLEO was specifically occa-
sioned by the denial of a county prosecutor's request to examine a list
of AFDC recipients to investigate whether court support orders were
being obeyed. 8 ' Proposals to make desertion or abandonment a federal
crime were defeated because of the cost of federal prosecution and the
propriety of involving the federal government in a domestic relations
problem; NOLEO was a compromise measure.' The legislative
history makes it clear that NOLEO was not intended to be a federal
eligibility requirement. In urging the passage of the original bill
containing the NOLEO provision, the bill's sponsor said in part:
In introducing this bill, I do not intend that aid shall be
withheld from any needy child, but rather this bill is aimed
177 Transmittal 120, 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(3) (ii) (d) (1970).
178 §402(a) (11), 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (11) (Supp. IV, 1969).
179 M K. EMAcNY, THE ABSENT FATHER AND PUBLIC POLICY IN THE PROGRAM OF
Am TO DEPENDENT CHILDREN 41-42 (1960) [hereinafter cited as McKEANY]. See also
BELL, mepra note 4, at 80.
180 MCKEANY 42 (citing Cohen, Factors Influencing the Content of Federal Public
Welfare Legislation, in THE SOCIAL WELFARE FORUM 210 (1954)).1 8 1 McK.NY 42-46.
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at parents, who, without justification, shift the financial re-
sponsibility for their children to the Federal, State, and local
governments.'
HEW regulations are to the same effect:
The public assistance job is seen as that of providing eligible
children with the assistance they need; and it is not the intent
of the legislation to deprive needy children of assistance in
order to punish their parents for neglect of their duties.
Although accepting assistance involves notice to the law en-
forcement officials if a parent has deserted or abandoned his
child, the amendment does not impose an additional eligibility
requirement.1
8 3
Although NOLEO was thus not a federal eligibility requirement,
many states felt free (as shall be seen) to establish eligibility require-
ments based on the NOLEO provisions. The above HEW regulation
suggests that state eligibility requirements based on the NOLEO pro-
visions are inadvisable and inconsistent with the purposes of the
Federal Act, but it does not explicitly prohibit a state from instituting
eligibility requirements of this type. Although Condition X would
appear to apply to this situation, it has not been invoked by HEW.
Under the King analysis suggested by this Comment, however,
NOLEO-related eligibility requirements are invalid unless in some
manner they can be considered determinations of need.'8s
a. Requirement That Applicant Consent to or File Complant Against
Deserter
Many states require as a condition of eligibility that an AFDC
applicant file a criminal or civil complaint against a deserting parent,
or expressly consent to the filing of a complaint by the state welfare
department.3' A requirement such as this is clearly non-need-related
and impermissible under King. There would be no objection, how-
ever, to stating on the application form that a deserting parent will be
sued or prosecuted by the welfare department if the applicant accepts
18 2 Hearings on H.R. 2983 Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 81st
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 1978 (1949) (statement of Representative Steed).
183U.S. Dept. of Health, Education, & Welfare, Handbook of Public Assistance
Administration, pt. IV, § 8120, in 2 Sparer, supra note 40, ch. 7, at 44-45.
184 For example, a father not supporting his illegitimate child could conceivably
be considered a "resource" of the child and aid accordingly terminated. Even were a
complaint filed against the father, however, there is no guarantee that a judgment
could be obtained against him for any significant amount. "Studies in this area gen-
erally conclude that the absent fathers of needy children tend, like their families, to be
poor, and even vigorous law enforcement does not create income." BELL, supra note 4,
at 214 n.7. HEW regulations require that only "net income as is actually available
for current use on a regular basis" be considered in determining need. 45 C.F.R.
§203.1(b) (1970).
185 See 13 WELFAtE L. BuLL., June 1968, at 14, discussing Young v. Massachusetts
Dep't of Pub. Welfare, No. 147 (Mass. Super. Ct., filed Feb. 16, 1968; settled June
12, 1968) & In re M., No. 69378 (Ariz. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, Apr. 1, 1968).
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aid. In fact, if the policy of the welfare department is to pursue such
a course of action, the applicant should be notified so that he can decide
whether he wishes to apply for aid. This policy might discourage
AFDC applications, but an eligibility requirement is not thereby
instituted.
If the welfare department merely requested that the applicant sign
a statement indicating that he understood this policy, no eligibility re-
quirement would be established unless the applicant were required to
sign the statement, although an applicant might be misled into think-
ing that his signature was required. But if the applicant were required
to sign the statement, an eligibility requirement unrelated to need would
be established. Where the welfare department is empowered under
state law to sue without the applicant's consent, 88 the applicant might
nevertheless refuse to give his unneeded "consent" out of fear of retribu-
tion from the deserter, out of stubborness, or as a sign of dissatisfaction
with the welfare system. Denial of aid to applicants in such a situation
may be phrased in terms of "lack of cooperation"; but in fact such a
determination is simply a moral eligibility requirement similar to the
requirement condemned in King. The state's interest in requiring
consent or a signature indicating understanding of the department
policy is illusory. An applicant refusing to sign could easily be ques-
tioned to determine his understanding that the deserter would still be
sued. And where the welfare department is required to obtain the
applicant's consent in order to sue under state law, the state's interest
could easily be protected by changing the law. Thus such requirements
are an unjustified and largely unnecessary restriction on eligibility,
falling clearly within the proscription of the King rationale.
b. Requirement That Mother of Illegitimate Child Name the Father
At first glance, a welfare department's requirement that the
mother of an illegitimate child name the father so that the department
can institute support action appears quite reasonable. But the reason-
ableness fades upon closer examination.
In Doe v. Shapiro :187 such a "name the father" regulation was in-
volved, and the court employed an analysis similar to that presented
180 E.g., CAL. WEL. & INsT'Ns CODE § 11476 (West 1966).
187 302 F. Supp. 761 (D. Conn. 1969), appeal dismissed for failure to docket within
prescribed time, 396 U.S. 488 (1970) (Black & Douglas, JJ., dissenting). Surprisingly,
Doe was reviewed by a columnist in the public press, most likely-as the title of the
column evidences-because of the "human interest" nature of the case. Cuneo, Federal
court upholds Hester Prynwe .. . at last, Phila. Evening Bulletin, Feb. 7, 1970, at 9,
col. 4. Considering the hostility that normally greets AFDC, it was also surprising
that this columnist cited the case approvingly. Subsequent to the dismissal of the Doe
appeal, Connecticut changed the rule at issue so as to terminate aid to the mother who
refused to name the father and grant aid to the child. On the theory that the child's
aid was inextricable from aid to the mother, a federal district court found the Con-
necticut officials in contempt of the Doe order and threatened sanctions unless they
restored the aid denied under the invalid rule. Doe v. Harder, 310 F. Supp. 302
(D. Conn.), appeal dismissed, 399 U.S. 902 (1970).
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in this Comment. Mrs. Doe refused to name the father of her illegiti-
mate son, Scott, and the Connecticut welfare department thereupon
removed the child from the AFDC program, while continuing to aid
Mrs. Doe and her three legitimate children. A federal three-judge
court held that section 402 (a) (10) requires states to aid all dependent
children. The court also held that NOLEO and the 1967 amendments
do not constitute a federal eligibility requirement, and that therefore
Scott Doe had been improperly denied aid.
The state certainly has a legitimate interest in requiring support
from the father of an illegitimate child, yet obviously its interest is
frustrated if it cannot obtain the name of the father. Cutting off
AFDC benefits may well be the only viable method of forcing the
mother to name the father. Furthermore, Congress has expressed
grave concern over the problem of deserting fathers: thus both Con-
gress and the state are interested in forcing the mother to name the
father.
But there are good reasons for not forcing a mother to name the
father of her illegitimate child. Appealing Doe to the Supreme Court,
Connecticut argued that:
The Connecticut regulation . . . has the further social
goal of protecting the mother from her own shortsighted
stupidity caused by her desire to protect her current para-
mour rather than protecting the future of her children.'
Conceivably a mother would refuse to name the father of her child
simply to protect a man for whom she feels affection. But because
actual contributions by the father are considered in determining need
and she thus does not gain financially from refusing to name the
father, it is just as likely that the mother will refuse to name the non-
supporting father for other reasons, such as her feeling that a low
pressure approach may lead to marriage, or at least some financial
support. This, in fact, was the reason behind Mrs. Doe's refusal to
name Scott's father.' 9
The Connecticut welfare department's response to Mrs. Doe is an
excellent example of what one authority has called the "best interest
theory" in welfare administration.0 0 According to this theory, welfare
departments virtually always rationalize their actions in terms of what
they consider to be the best interests of the recipient, disregarding the
recipient's own evaluation of his position. Thus, although Mrs. Doe
determined from her own experience that it was in her children's best
interest not to pressure Scott's father, the welfare department insisted
that she was incorrect.
188 Jurisdictional Statement at 5-6, Shapiro v. Doe, 396 U.S. 488 (1970).
189 Interview with Professor Edward V. Sparer, University of Pennsylvania Law
School, in Philadelphia, April 20, 1970.
10o Sparer, The Place of Law in Social Work Education: A Commentary on Dean
Schottland's Article, 17 ButFALo L. REv. 733, 735 (1968).
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Of course, a state may decide that money in hand is better than
gambling on a future marriage, notwithstanding the desirability of the
latter result. This policy decision, having no bearing on the legality
of the state's action in terminating aid, is one the state is free to make;
but whether or not Connecticut properly decided this policy question,
it is prohibited by the King rationale from denying aid to Scott Doe.
AFDC is not intended to provide the state a sword to deter parental
misbehavior; thus the importance of the state's interest cannot be con-
sidered controlling when it denies aid to needy dependent children.
The possible variations on NOLEO themes are boundless. Some
local welfare agencies have required as a condition to aid that the
applicant actually locate the father rather than simply name him."
Attempts have been made to condition aid on the mother's willingness
to undergo a lie detector test to substantiate the identity of the father
of her illegitimate child. 192
3. Other State Eligibility Requirements Unrelated to Need
As the specific discussion of the NOLEO and fraud situations has
suggested, non-need-related state eligibility requirements subject to
challenge under the King rationale are numerous. Although an ex-
tensive categorization is not attempted, a few examples provide an
idea of the continuous variety.
193
A number of challenges are being addressed to state provisions
granting aid to children over the age of eighteen only if they attend
specified types of schools.' In at least one state, misguided theories
of social "therapy" have resulted in a requirement that the mother
of an illegitimate child make a "personal effort" to contact the father
and have him come to the offices of the welfare department with
her."" This policy has been pursued even when the father has re-
married after parting with the applicant under unpleasant circum-
stances.'9  Inadvertent overpayment by the welfare department may
occasion a restitution requirement, even though the family has com-
pletely spent the overpayments. 97 Any conclusive presumption that
money is available to a dependent child, when the money is in fact
unavailable, is also open to a King challenge.
Other practices, although not normally considered as such, are
eligibility requirements in effect. The controversial practice of "mid-
191 Mississippi State Advisory Comm'n, Welfare in Mississippi: A Report to the
United States Commission on Civil Rights 18 (February 1969), in 2 Sparer, supra
note 40, ch. 7, at 47.
19 2 See County of Contra Costa v. Social Welfare Bd., 229 Cal. App. 2d 762,
40 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1964).
193 Welfare's "Condition X," supra note 1, at 1228-33, discusses some other im-
portant examples.
.94 See, e.g., Alexander v. Swank. 2 CCH Pov. L. REP. 11 9614 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
195 See Sparer, supra note 190, at 736-37.
196 Id. 736.
19 7 See Stallworth v. California, No. 48393 (N.D. Cal., filed Dec. 13, 1967).
HEW regulations prohibit this. Transmittal 120, 45 C.F.R. § 23320(3) (ii) (d)
(1970).
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night raids" "' to determine whether a welfare recipient is living with
a man began to fall out of favor even before the Court's decision in
King; where this practice exists in order to determine fraud, or where
more conventional fraud investigations are used, consent to a search
by the caseworker is often administered as an eligibility requirement.199
Consent to a "home visit" by a caseworker is a frequent eligibility
requirement. ° Unnecessarily burdensome application procedures 201
can perhaps be considered eligibility requirements. Ultimately the
range of state regulations subject to attack under King is limited prin-
cipally by counsel's ability to perceive the true nature of provisions in
fact constituting eligibility requirements unrelated to need.
SUMMARY
The Supreme Court's decision in King subjects many state welfare
regulations to challenge on the grounds that they do not conform to the
AFDC provisions of the Social Security Act. States have long con-
sidered themselves free to deny welfare benefits as they saw fit. The
federal agency charged with the administration of the AFDC program
only prohibited state eligibility requirements not "reasonably related"
to the purposes of the federal statute; moreover, this policy, known as
Condition X, was enforced only sporadically.
King not only prohibits states from withholding AFDC to deter
illegitimacy or control sexual conduct, but also precludes all eligibility
requirements unrelated to need, except those explicitly sanctioned by
the statute or its legislative history.
This interpretation is finding increasing judicial acceptance; if
this trend continues, and if Congress or the state legislatures can be
convinced to raise the unconscionably low level of welfare benefits,
America may eventually achieve the rather modest goal of providing
adequate economic protection for at least those children of its poor
within the scope of the federal AFDC provisions.
Roger E. Kohn
198 See geitrally Parrish v. Civil Service Comm'n, 66 Cal. 2d 200, 425 P2d 223,
57 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1967); Bell, The 'Rights' of the Poor: Welfare Witch-hunts in
the District of Columbia, 13 J. Soc. WORx 60 (1968). Note that U.S. Dep't of
Health, Education, & Welfare, Handbook of Public Assistance Administration § 2300
(a) (Transmittal 139), prohibits policies "that violate the individual's privacy or
personal dignity, or harass him, or violate his constitutional rights. .. . [especially
such violations as] making home visits outside working hours .... "
199 See Bible v. Smith, 3 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 26 (Wash. Sup. Ct. 1969) ; Patricia
A. Smith, Nos. C71-3502.0 & C174-570.0, at 23-24 (D.C. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, Oct.
16, 1968), in 2 Sparer, supra note 40, ch. 8, at 18.
200 James v. Goldberg, 303 F. Supp. 935 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (declaring a home visit
a search within the meaning of the fourth amendment), prob. juris. noted sub nom.
Wyman v. James, 397 U.S. 904 (1970).
201 See generally Comment, Eligibility Determinations in Public Assistance: Se-
lected Problems and Proposals for Refomn in Pennsylvania, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 1307,
1316, 1319 (1967).
